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Prior research on emotional intelligence (EI) has highlighted the use of incremental
models that assume EI and general intelligence (or g) make independent contributions
to performance. Questioning this assumption, we study EI’s moderation power over
the relationship between g and individual performance, by designing and testing a
task-dependent interaction model. Reconciling divergent findings in previous studies, we
propose that whenever social tasks are at stake, g has a greater effect on performance
as EI increases. By contrast, in analytic tasks, a compensatory (or negative) interaction
is expected, whereby at higher levels of EI, g contributes to performance at a lesser
extent. Based on a behavioral approach to EI, using 360-degree assessments of EI
competencies, our findings show that EI moderates the effect of g on the classroom
performance of 864 MBA business executives. Whilst in analytic tasks g has a stronger
effect on performance at lower levels of EI competencies, our data comes short to show
a positive interaction of EI and g in affecting performance on social tasks. Contributions
and implications to research and practice are discussed.
Keywords: emotional intelligence, emotional intelligence competencies, general cognitive ability, social tasks,
analytic tasks, individual performance
INTRODUCTION
General intelligence, or g, has been the most studied and well-established predictor of professional
and academic achievement. However, the last 25 years have witnessed the rise of emotional
intelligence (EI), propelled by claims that it is superior to IQ in predicting performance (Goleman,
1995; Watkin, 2000). Defined as a set of abilities ranging from perception to regulation of emotions
in the self and in others (Mayer and Salovey, 1997), the concept of EI has motivated extensive
research aiming to show it has an incremental impact on performance (Lam and Kirby, 2002;
Ferrando et al., 2011; Boyatzis et al., 2012). Yet, a recent source of controversy in the field
concerns the increasing number of studies and meta-analyses attesting to mixed results (Van
Rooy and Viswesvaran, 2004; Amelang and Steinmayr, 2006; Christiansen et al., 2010; Brackett
et al., 2011). We contend that this lack of consistency across findings may be due, in part, to
the predominance of models that measure the direct effect of EI on individual performance,
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above and beyond cognitive intelligence (known as incremental
or additive models)—despite the fact that the scientific concept
of emotional intelligence implies the integration of emotion
and cognitive processes. Thus, paradoxically, multiplicative or
interactive models have remained underexplored. Moreover,
although it is clear that those who score high in both EI and g
achieve top performances, little is known about predicting the
performance of individuals with high levels of one ability and low
of the other.
The present study thus examines the interaction effect of EI
and g on individual performance. We do so in awareness that the
first few studies of EI and g’s interaction on both job and academic
performance are gathering further mixed findings. Notably,
research conducted in organizations shows that EI and social
skills improve the relationship between general mental ability
and job performance. (Ferris et al., 2001; Verbeke et al., 2008;
Kidwell et al., 2011). However, studies in academic institutions
draw opposite results: researchers propose a compensatorymodel
(or negative interaction) between EI and g, by which individuals’
cognitive abilities have a smaller chance of contributing to
performance whenever EI is high (Petrides et al., 2004; Côté
and Miners, 2006; Agnoli et al., 2012; Fiori, 2015). In Casciaro
and Lobo’s (2005: 1) terms, these results seem to show that in
academic settings, as opposed to organizational ones, it pays
off to be a “competent jerk,” i.e., a person who’s cognitively
sharp but lacks the ability to communicate and relate with
others.
In the attempt to reconcile such inconsistent findings
between academic and organizational settings, we contend
that whether EI and general mental ability interact in the
way of complementing or compensating each other ultimately
depends on the type of task being performed. As such, adopting
Jack et al.’s (2012) categorization of tasks, we hypothesize
that in social tasks, EI and g may function as complements,
mutually reinforcing their effects on performance. By contrast,
in analytic or non-social tasks, when EI is high, we may
observe that performance is less vulnerable to the level of
cognitive ability, since individuals are able to use their EI
competencies as a coping device whenever they lack the
intellectual ability to perform the task successfully. As such,
we design a task-dependent interaction model of EI and g
on performance, and test it on a population of managers and
business executives enrolled as part time candidates in an
international MBA program at a leading European business
school.
Overall, this study offers three valuable contributions to the
EI-performance research: First, because “worthwhile findings
may emerge from research utilizing other approaches to assessing
EI [other than Ability EI or Trait EI], including multisource
(‘360◦’) assessments, videotapes of simulations or behavioral
coding of taped interviews (Boyatzis, 2009; Boyatzis et al., 2012).”
(Webb et al., 2013: 155), our study assesses individuals’ behavioral
manifestations of EI as rated by external informants from
the professional context (i.e., bosses, peers and direct reports).
Second, it unveils the understudied moderator role of EI on the
relationship between g and performance. Third, it internalizes
task-dependence in the analysis, by considering two types of tasks
(social and analytic) within the same sample. In so doing, we
are first, to our knowledge, to examine the interactive effect of
a behavioral measure of EI on individual performance.
BEHAVIORAL EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE
A scientific conception of emotional intelligence first came to
form in 1990 as a true intellectual ability that met traditional
standards for an intelligence (Salovey and Mayer, 1990; Mayer
et al., 1999). EI has since been defined as a set of interrelated
skills, including “the ability to perceive accurately, appraise, and
express emotion; the ability to access and/or generate feelings
when they facilitate thought; the ability to understand emotions
and emotional knowledge; and the ability to regulate emotions to
promote emotional and intellectual growth.” (Mayer and Salovey,
1997: 10).
Despite EI’s field being deep in controversy with several
definitions and assessments over its first 25 years of research,
emotional intelligence, as a concept that comprises a set of inter-
related abilities pertaining to the perception and regulation of
emotions in the self and in others, provides a common content
domain to existing EI measures (Joseph et al., 2014). What
essentially distinguishes existing EI models is their choice of
measurement theory, a decision that is grounded in the level at
which one chooses to observe EI: be it as a mental ability, a trait
of personality, or an actual behavior as assessed by others.
In perhaps the most well-established classification of EI
research (Ashkanasy and Daus, 2005) contend there are three
streams or approaches to EI: While Streams 1 and 2 are solely
devoted to measures based onMayer and Salovey’s (1997) Ability
EI model–assessed either by performance tests (MSCEIT; Mayer
et al., 2003) in Stream 1 or peer-reports and self-assessments in
Stream 2 (e.g., Schutte et al., 1998; Jordan et al., 2002; Wong and
Law, 2002)—all other remaining EI models have been clustered
in Stream 3, or what has been labeled the “mixed EI” approaches
(Mayer et al., 1999). Referring to the obscure nature of this
label, Joseph et al. (2014: 2) called it a “black box” and noticed
how prior theoretical work on mixed EI is scant. To be sure,
mixed EI has never been conceptualized. In fact, it is seldom
used in any of the EI approaches it represents. Rather it is a
“uninformative label” created to designate all research on EI that
does not use or adapt Ability EI’s model (Boyatzis et al., 2015).
Consequently, recent research (Cherniss and Boyatzis, 2013;
Amdurer et al., 2014; Boyatzis et al., 2017) proposes that Stream 3
be split further to allow distinguishing Trait EI (Stream 3), which
assesses EI through self-reports of personality traits, attitudes
and motivations (e.g., EQ-i; Bar-On, 1997a), from Behavioral
EI (Stream 4), an approach that captures EI as is manifested in
real contexts by collecting external informants’ observations (as
opposed to self-assessments) of an individual’s behavior (ESCI;
Boyatzis and Goleman, 2007). This distinction enables future
meta-analyses to properly differentiate all existing EI approaches.
After all, “[all] these approaches try to discover the emotional
components that underlie emotionally intelligent people and the
mechanisms and processes that set off the use of these abilities in
our everyday life” (Fernández-Berrocal and Extremera, 2006: 8,
emphasis added).
In this paper we use the behavioral approach to EI, for it
allows capturing emotional intelligence at a level that is closer
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to action and consequential to real-life and work performance,
i.e., actual behavior in situated contexts. Considering that the
etymological roots of emotion come from the Latin word
emovere, a combination of ex (out) + movere (to move) is a
good reminder that emotion is strongly associated with external
movement that provides signals to others. Darwin’s (1872)
treatise on emotional expression performed a comparative study
of humans and animals and gathered unequivocal evidence
on the breadth of emotional communication that is captured
through body movements and facial expressions. Similarly,
emotional intelligence can be seized in both verbal and non-
verbal behavior that is visible and consequential to others,
offering a sound basis to establish a behavioral approach to EI.
Conceptually, behavioral EI concerns the same content
domain as other EI approaches, i.e., the concept of emotional
intelligence as defined in Salovey and Mayer (1990). Specifically,
the Emotional and Social Competency Inventory model (ESCI;
Boyatzis, 2009) parallels the original definition of EI, in that
it contains behavioral indicators of competencies that reflect:
(1) the same core abilities of awareness (or perception) and
management (or regulation) of emotion; and (2) the same targets,
that is, whether these abilities are directed at self or others.
In a critical review of the field, Zeidner et al. (2004) clarifies
that what differentiates the approach of ability EI from its
behavioral counterpart is akin to the distinction between fluid
and crystallized ability. As the authors explain: “EI (as a fluid
ability) does not guarantee that individuals will actually manifest
competent behaviors at the workplace. (. . . ) Whereas [ability]
EI may determine a person’s potential for learning practical
job-related emotional and social skills, the level of emotional
competencies (as a crystallized ability) manifested by that person
shows how much of that potential she or he has actually realized”
(Zeidner et al., 2004: 377). Indeed, some individuals may be
good at mindfully thinking and coming up with solutions to
hypothetical emotional-laden problems, but lack the training or
experience for actually performing the behaviors they prescribe
(Fiori, 2009).
The ESCI model used in this paper is empirically supported by
40 years of research identifying competencies that predict work
success (McClelland, 1973; Boyatzis, 1982; Spencer and Spencer,
1993). Competencies have been defined as learned capabilities
that lead to effective or superior performance and are reflected
by a set of behaviors that share a common underlying intent
(Boyatzis, 2009). Because the identification of competencies and
their refinement emerges from a performance based criterion
sampling, they are expected and in fact have been shown to
consistently predict academic, job and life outcomes (Boyatzis,
1982, 2006; Spencer and Spencer, 1993; McClelland, 1998;
Dulewicz et al., 2003; Law et al., 2004; Boyatzis et al., 2011, 2012;
Amdurer et al., 2014; Mahon et al., 2014).
EI, COGNITIVE ABILITY AND
PERFORMANCE
Throughout the past century, general mental ability, also known
as general intelligence, general cognitive ability or simply g, has
taken the leading role in enlightening our understanding of
human performance (Fiori and Antonakis, 2012; Nisbett et al.,
2012; Webb et al., 2014). As a global ability concerning the
“general efficacy of intellectual processes” Ackrman et al., (2005:
32), g is thought of as the apex or common factor to all types
of specific intelligences—e.g., fluid intelligence (Gf), crystallized
intelligence (Gc), broad visual perception (Gv), broad auditory
perception (Gu), broad cognitive speediness (Gs), etc. (Carroll,
1993; McGrew, 1997). As a latent construct, g is not observed
directly; rather, it is inferred from the positive correlations among
specific mental abilities (Spearman, 1904; Jensen, 1998). A large
body of evidence shows g has a strong relationship to school and
workplace performance across tasks and settings (Gottfredson,
1997; Jensen, 1998; Ree and Carretta, 1998; Schmidt and Hunter,
1998; Ree and Carreta, 2002; Salgado et al., 2003).
But, although g correlates between 0.30 and 0.50 with several
performance measures, it actually only explains about 25% of
their variance (Hunter and Hunter, 1984; Goldstein et al., 2002).
For this reason, the case for EI has been built over claims that it
explains variance in performance that has not yet been accounted
for by cognitive intelligence (Goleman, 1995; Mayer and Salovey,
1997; Mayer et al., 2000; Watkin, 2000). This argument has
led researchers to put an emphasis on identifying direct
additive effects of emotional intelligence on performance, which
assume emotional intelligence and cognitive intelligence make
independent contributions to human performance. Paradoxically
though, this assumption of independence is in contradiction
with the very concept of emotional intelligence, by which
“emotion makes thinking more intelligent and that one thinks
intelligently about emotions.” (Mayer and Salovey, 1997: 5).
Furthermore, the original conceptualization of EI emerged from
an important neuroscience discovery: the integration of emotion
within cognitive processes across a variety of mental functions
such as memory, attention, and decision-making (Mayer and
Bremer, 1985; Forgas and Moylan, 1987; Damasio, 1994). Hence,
additive models may in fact be too “simplistic and incomplete”
to represent the contribution of EI to performance (Côté and
Miners, 2006: 2).
In what regards the relationship between EI and workplace
performance, recent meta-analyses suggest that emotional
intelligence positively affects several aspects of workplace
performance (Joseph and Newman, 2010; O’Boyle et al., 2011),
including company rank and pay increases (Lopes et al.,
2006) and supervisor ratings (Côté and Miners, 2006). In
particular, emotional and social competencies have been shown
to positively affect sales leadership performance (Boyatzis
et al., 2012), management (Ramo et al., 2009; Boyatzis et al.,
2012), entrepreneurship performance (Camuffo et al., 2012) and
engineers’ effectiveness and engagement (Boyatzis et al., 2017).
Other studies, however, find significant relationships between
EI and workplace performance but do not take general mental
ability into account (Bar-On, 2000; Law et al., 2004).
As to EI’s effect on academic performance, previous studies
report conflicting findings (Brackett et al., 2011): whereas some
research shows that EI explains achievement in high school
(Gil-Olarte Márquez et al., 2006) and undergraduate programs
(Lam and Kirby, 2002), other studies suggest there is no relation
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 3 September 2018 | Volume 9 | Article 1532
Truninger et al. The Power of EI Over g and Performance
or a non-significant one between emotional intelligence and
academic performance (Petrides et al., 2004). In fact, it is often
the case that studies will initially show positive effects of EI
on performance until they eventually become non-significant
after controlling for variables such as cognitive intelligence and
personality traits (Barchard, 2003; Brackett and Mayer, 2003).
Such large variation across studies is leading EI researchers to
adopt multiplicative models, whereby the interaction effect of EI
and g on performance is explored (e.g., Petrides et al., 2004; Côté
and Miners, 2006; Kidwell et al., 2011).
Moreover, prior research has devoted little attention to
examine how EI may relate differently to performance depending
on the type of task (Rode et al., 2007). Notably, EI may be
especially relevant in tasks that require social interactions (Lopes
et al., 2004) and group processes (Druskat and Wolff, 2001;
Jordan and Troth, 2004). For this matter, we propose a task-
dependent model of the interaction between EI and g on
individual performance.
A TASK-DEPENDENT INTERACTION
MODEL OF EI, g AND PERFORMANCE
We propose that the interaction between EI and g on human
performance depends on the type of task. We use a taxonomy
of tasks that takes into account the content of the information
processed (Jack et al., 2012; Friedman et al., 2015). According to
Jack et al. (2012) task content is based on two opposing cognitive
domains: The social cognitive domain relates to tasks that require
social information processing, i.e., reasoning about the minds of
others and/or involving interpersonal interaction, which plays
a leading role in emotional self-awareness, social cognition and
ethical decision making. The analytic (or non-social) cognitive
domain pertains to tasks that require reasoning about the causal
or mechanical properties of inanimate objects, thought to be
most relevant for problem solving, focusing of attention, making
decisions and action control (for a review see Boyatzis et al.,
2014).
The study of these two types of tasks within a single sample
requires choosing a setting that enables the separation between
social and analytic tasks. One advantage of conducting this study
in an academic setting stems from the ability to distinguish social
from analytic tasks within performance units, seen that we can
select distinct courses with significantly different amounts of
social and analytic tasks. For example, courses such as Marketing
or Leadership that involve reflecting about human decision-
making and social information processing can be said to include
substantially more social tasks (i.e., discussions about human
behavior and interpersonal interaction), than analytic courses
such as Finance or Statistics, which revolve around abstract and
arithmetic concepts. Specifically this study is conducted within an
internationalMBA program, wherein the classroom performance
of business executives in both social and analytic courses is
assessed.1
1By social courses we mean courses that have a substantial amount of social tasks,
whereas analytic courses have a greater amount of analytic tasks.
Social Tasks
When individuals engage in social tasks, what is the interactive
nature of the relationship between EI and g on performance? We
propose that when individuals have low levels of EI competencies,
such that they can’t get along with others, they will have poor
performances, regardless of their level of intelligence. Their
inability to relate with and understand others hinders their
capacity to collaborate and be of service to others, which
ultimately compromises their overall performance. An anecdote
typically found in organizations illustrates this: “She may be a
genius, but she isn’t getting things done here because she can’t
work with people.” In Casciaro and Lobo (2005)’s terms this
would correspond to a “competent jerk,” who regardless of how
intelligent he may be, he will still end up being dismissed by
others, which in non-modular work that necessarily involves
interpersonal interactions, it will lead to a poor performance.
This way, at low levels of EI the relationship between g and
performance is significantly attenuated.
Conversely, high levels of emotional intelligence act as
a catalyzer or booster of the relationship between cognitive
intelligence and performance. This way, even extremely
intelligence people can further heighten their performance by
learning EI competencies that enable them to share information
and effectively collaborate with others. Notably, referring to
the myth of the lone genius that pervades our society, Shenk
(2014) exposes an unexpected finding: the lone geniuses
are just the most well-known halves of collaborative duos.
Interestingly, examples abound: Lennon-McCartney, Newton-
Halley, Einstein-Besso or more recently Kahneman-Tversky.
Notably, the Economics Nobel Prize winner, Daniel Kahneman,
illustrates his collaboration with Amos Tversky, as follows:
“Indeed, one of the great joys in the collaboration was that Amos
frequently saw the point of my vague ideas much more clearly
than I did. For the next fourteen years our collaboration was
the focus of our lives, and the work we did together during those
years was the best either of us ever did.” Kahneman (2011: 5–6).
Thus, in social tasks, EI and g contributions to performance are
mutually reinforcing such that they act as strategic complements.2
Therefore, we propose the following:
Hypothesis 1. In social tasks, the relationship between general
mental ability (or g) and performance is stronger among
individuals at higher levels of EI competencies.
Analytic (or Non-social) Tasks
When engaging in analytic tasks, which require practically no
social skills, we expect that the performance of individuals at
lower levels of EI competencies will be more vulnerable or
sensitive to their level of cognitive abilities. While individuals
with low EI and low g will have bottom low performances, those
with low EI but high g, will be able to significantly compensate for
their shortage of EI competencies by investing on or deploying
their cognitive abilities. This is particularly so because cognitive
2We borrow this term from economics and game theory, wherein two investment
decisions are called strategic complements if they mutually reinforce one another,
i.e., if an increase in the investment on one item raises the marginal return of
the other. Otherwise when investment decisions offset one another they are called
strategic substitutes (Bulow et al., 1985).
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skills may not only be necessary but sufficient to accomplish
analytic tasks successfully.
Conversely, at higher levels of EI competencies, performance
becomes less vulnerable to an individual’s level of cognitive
abilities. On one hand, individuals with high EI but low g,
can effectively deal with feelings of frustration and withdrawal
whenever facing cognitively challenging tasks. By deploying EI
competencies such as emotional self-awareness, emotional self-
control, achievement orientation or positive outlook, they are
better able to cope with and manage emotions in such a way that
motivates and energizes them to be confident in their ability to
learn and to adopt a growth mindset, setting them up in a path to
greater performance. This way, once an individual has high EI
competencies—particularly those related to self-awareness and
self-management—moving from low to high g has a smaller
impact on performance (as compared to having low EI), since
these individuals are well-equipped to cope with and overcome
the emotional turmoil of facing cognitively challenging tasks,
keep calm and move on to reach higher levels of performance.
As such, in analytic tasks, EI and g have a compensatory
effect (or negative interaction) on performance. In result, these
two abilities may be perceived as strategic substitutes,3 whereby
individuals might have a greater incentive to invest in learning
EI competencies, the lower their cognitive skills are. From the
preceding discussion we suggest the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2. In analytic tasks, the relationship between general
mental ability (or g) and performance is weaker among individuals
at higher levels EI competencies.
Figure 1 below shows the overall path diagram of the task-
dependent interaction model of EI competencies and cognitive
ability for enhancing performance, including both structural and
measurement relationships.
DATA AND METHODS
Participants
Data were collected on 864 managers and business executives
enrolled in part-time and executive MBA programs at a top
European business school, between 2006 and 2013. There were
31% females, and the average age was 29 years (SD = 2.6). As
part of the MBA, the candidates took the compulsory course of
Leadership Assessment and Development, which is based on the
Intentional Change Theory (Boyatzis, 2008), and is specifically
designed to develop emotional and social competencies. In
this course, the candidates completed a self-assessment and
selected multiple raters from their professional sphere (i.e.,
bosses, peers and direct reports) to provide a 360 appraisal of
their EI competencies. All data were collected under the informed
consent and ethical guidelines of ESADE Business School.
Measures
Behavioral EI
We used the Emotional and Social Competency Inventory-
University Edition (ESCI-U; Boyatzis and Goleman, 2007).
The ESCI-U comprises 12 EI competencies organized into
3See footnote 2.
four clusters corresponding to the Cartesian product between
EI abilities (awareness/management of emotion) and the
target: self/others. Those clusters are: Self-awareness, which
includes the competency of emotional self-awareness; Self-
management, including emotional self-control, adaptability,
achievement orientation and positive outlook; Social awareness,
which consists of empathy and organizational awareness;
and Relationship management comprising coach and mentor,
inspirational leadership, influence, conflict management and
teamwork. Each EI competency is measured with five behavioral
indicators (totaling 60 indicators).
The ESCI model measures behavioral EI as is seen and
assessed by others. For this matter, it uses a 360◦ assessment
instrument (Sala, 2002; Boyatzis and Sala, 2004; Boyatzis
and Goleman, 2007), which enables multiple raters from the
professional sphere—namely bosses, peers and direct reports,
to provide behavioral observation scores of the person being
assessed. The ESCI-U has provided evidence of construct and
discriminant validity (Byrne et al., 2007; Cherniss, 2010; Cherniss
and Boyatzis, 2013; Boyatzis et al., 2015). The ESCI-U asks both
self-report and external raters to score the frequency of each
behavioral indicator on an 11 point-scale going from 0, “the
behavior is never shown” to 10, “the behavior is consistently
shown.” The 11-point scale has been shown to be superior to the
5-point scale for rating frequency (Batista-Foguet et al., 2009).
General Mental Ability (g)
We used the Graduate Management Admission Test (GMAT) to
measure general mental ability or g. The GMAT is a standardized
test for admission into graduate management programs. It
assesses analytical, mathematical, writing and reading skills,
across which the underlying common factor is interpreted as the g
factor. Several studies before ours have used GMAT as a measure
of g (e.g.,O’Reilly and Chatman, 1994; Kumari and Corr, 1996;
Hedlund et al., 2006; Mueller and Curhan, 2006; Boyatzis et al.,
2015), including a study published in Intelligence (Piffer et al.,
2014). For instance, Hedlund et al. (2006: 102) concludes that
“like the SAT [a standardized test which has been shown to be
a valid measure of g (Frey and Detterman, 2004)], the GMAT can
be characterized as a traditional measure of intelligence, or a test
of general cognitive ability (g).”
Individual Performance
We measured performance by computing scores for the MBA
candidates’ grading performance at social and analytic courses,
based on a total of 45 course gradings collected at the university
registrar after the end of each term. In order to classify the
courses as social or analytic, we created a set of 16 binary
indicators to code each course syllabus for the presence of social
content (10 words pertaining to social content were used, such
as “human” or “society”) and social interactions (i.e., degree of
teamwork, use of debates in class). Two raters coded the 45
courses’ syllabi and achieved an inter-rater reliability of 88%,
well above the generally accepted threshold of 70% (Stemler,
2004). Next, we used an item-response theory model to estimate
a single latent dimension, upon which only the courses with
loadings higher than 1 in absolute value were kept for the analysis.
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FIGURE 1 | Path diagram of the task-dependent interaction model of EI and general intelligence on the individual performance on social vs. analytic tasks. Dashed
lines represent direct effects that have been previously tested in earlier research and thus are not represented in our hypotheses.
Therefore, courses such as Entrepreneurship, Managing People
or Global Marketing, with loadings higher than 1 were labeled
“Social,” while Accounting I, Finance or Business Analysis to
Valuation, with loadings below −1, were labeled “Analytic.”
The performance scores for each type of course were then
obtained by computing simple averages across individual grades.
Each individual grade was however a standardized score of the
position of the individual in the group/year for a given course.
Standardizing by group/year is an efficient way of eliminating
professor effects, or the differences in ratings regarding the
idiosyncrasies of certain topics. So what we are really measuring
is how well students perform as compared to other students (or,
in other words, considering the group), rather than raw grade
performance.
Procedures
In agreement with Anderson and Gerbing (1988), the data
analysis process is divided into two different models: the
measurement model, aforementioned, and the explanatory or
structural model.
The explanatory model is a non-nested hierarchical robust
linear model between individual performance and the covariates
(GMAT, ESCI, the interaction between the two, and gender as
a control variable—measured with a dummy variable that takes
the value 1 if gender is Female). The hierarchical structure is
necessary in order to account for the different ways in which
the data is naturally structured: first because there are two
measures of performance per individual (social and analytic
course performance) and some of the effects may or may not
be shared across the two types of courses; and second, because
emotional and social competencies are measured in a two-level
cluster: competencies and competency clusters. Equation (1)
below describes the explanatory model of the linear association
between performance (for two different types of task t) and the
covariates (X), when ESCI competencies (c) are measured by
professional raters (i.e., bosses, peers and direct reports), and
organized in clusters (cl) and higher-level clusters (CL), for each
of the individuals (i).
Yi ∼ T (µi, σi, υ)
µi = αt,c +
(
Femalei,GMATi,ESCIi,GMATi ∗ESCIi
)
θt,c
θt,c ∼ N
(
2t,cl, σθt
)
2t,cl ∼ N
(
µ2t,CL , σ2t
)
µ2t,CL ∼ N (0, 100)
σi = exp
(
Intercepti, Femalei,GMATi,ESCIi,c
)
λ
λ ∼ N (0, 10)
υ ∼ U (1, 20)
(1)
Equation (1) can be read as follows: Performance for any
individual in any of the two types of tasks (social or analytic) is a
linear combination of an intercept (α), the direct effect of general
intelligence, the direct effect of EI and, lastly, the interaction effect
between general intelligence and EI, controlling for gender.
Inference is performed using Bayesian procedures, namely
the Gibbs sampler and MCMC methods using the ggmcmc R
package (Fernández-i-Marín, 2016). There is one good reason
to prefer Bayesian inference for addressing our research: Our
data was not drawn from a random sample. This would pose
a problem if we were to use traditional frequentist methods
since these are based upon the assumption that the data are
created by a repeatable stochastic mechanism. While frequentist
statistics treats the observable data as random and the unknown
parameters of the population as fixed and unchanging, in the
Bayesian view, it is the observed variables that are taken as fixed
(which in reality, that is what happens, at least in the social
sciences: seldom do researchers collect 100 samples), whereas the
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unknown population parameters are assumed to vary randomly
according to a probability distribution4.
Overall, the main advantages of the Bayesian approach are
2-fold: (1) it is more appropriate for settings where the data is
not a random sample; and (2) it enables highly flexible model
specifications (as the one needed to account for the hierarchical
structure of our data). Furthermore, it offers a clear and intuitive
way to present results, by generating probability statements about
the findings (for more readings on the advantages of Bayesian
inference, see the introductory chapters of Gill, 2002; Gelman
et al., 2003; Jackman, 2009).
RESULTS
Figure 2 below offers a visual summary of the descriptive
statistics of the individuals, regarding the key variables in our
model.
Regarding the ESCI, Figure 2 shows that its density
distribution has a negative skew, with higher probabilities
associated with upper values, such that ESCI’s overall mean is
7.64 (SD = 1.16). In what concerns the 360◦ evaluations, there
were, on average, 4.2 (SD = 1.5) raters per MBA candidate who
provided feedback on their emotional and social competencies.
To summarize the 360◦ assessments on the ESCI questionnaire,
we first obtained for each behavioral indicator, the average score
across the professional raters. Then we averaged across the
five items per each competency to finally obtain one score per
competency. Concerning the GMAT, its sample mean of 602.6
was a little higher than the overall population mean of 545.
GMAT’s sample standard deviation of 78.8 was approximately
two thirds of its population counterpart at 121. The figure above
shows a slight negative skew, with considerably higher values for
males than females. As to performance, while in analytic courses
(in blue) the distribution is negatively skewed, in social courses
(in red) it is approximately normal.
Figure 3 shows the coefficient estimates, obtained through
robust regression, of GMAT, ESCI, and the interaction effect
between ESCI and GMAT on the performance in social and
analytic types of courses. The ESCI estimates are presented
in terms of the four clusters: Self-awareness, Self-management,
Social awareness, and Relationship management. Analogous to
a measure of effect size, the Bayesian approach to regression
modeling produces estimates of the percentage decrease in
the residuals’ standard deviation, an approximate measure of
(1 – R2). As such, the regression on social tasks resulted on an
average decrease in the residual standard deviation of 2.34%,
whereas the one on analytic tasks produced a decrease of 8.88%.
4Specifically, in the Bayesian approach a parameter is assigned a prior distribution
(based on previous research in the field), which is then updated with the observed
data by means of a specified likelihood function, so as to produce a posterior
distribution of the parameter (Wagner and Gill, 2005). In fact, the Bayesian
approach is not entitled to use a p-value (as in frequentist statistics), as the
probability of obtaining the observed data under the null hypothesis. Rather this
approach yields information about the probability of the hypothesis given the
data. As mentioned, the data is not a sample of a larger population but it is the
population of all part-time and executive MBAs between 2006 and 2013 at an
European business school.
Reading the panels in Figure 3, there are three main findings:
(1) GMAT has a positive effect of 0.5 grade points on the
performance in analytic courses, which is significantly higher
than the 0.1 grade points in social courses; (2) The direct
effect of ESCI on performance is inconclusive, with some of
the clusters such as Self-management having a negative effect
on performance, while others having no effect or a slightly
positive one, thus, confirming the mixed findings in previous EI-
performance studies using additive models; and (3) There is a
significant interaction effect of ESCI and GMAT on performance
and it is negative for both types of tasks. This finding informs
the central research question in this study. While it supports
hypothesis 2 of a negative interaction between EI competencies
and general intelligence on the performance of analytic tasks,
it shows no support for hypothesis 1. However, there is a
positive second order interaction, by which the interaction effect
increases from analytic to social courses, i.e., social tasks have
a closer to positive interaction than analytic tasks do. This
finding may be viewed as offering a hint of support to hypothesis
1.
Figure 4 provides a visual summary of the moderating
effect of ESCI on the relationship between GMAT and
individual performance in social and analytic courses. Expected
performance is shown in red for social courses and in blue
for analytic courses. Dashed lines represent individuals scoring
below the 25th quantile of ESCI scores, whereas solid lines
represent the top 25% individuals with the highest ESCI
observed. The horizontal axis accounts for the range of
potentially observed GMAT values. As expected the effect of
GMAT on performance is positive in both types of tasks with a
higher effect on analytic than social courses. As ESCI shifts from
low to high levels the effect of GMAT on performance decreases
(the slope becomes flatter). However, this decrease is lower in
social than analytic tasks, which, as aforementioned, offers a hint
of support to hypothesis 1.
DISCUSSION
Earlier research has proposed that emotional intelligence and
cognitive abilities contribute to performance in independent
ways (Mayer et al., 2000). The present study shows that
rather than an incremental additive effect on performance,
EI, as measured by a behavioral assessment instrument, has
a multiplicative effect: Specifically, behavioral EI moderates
the relationship between g and the individual performance
of business executives. As predicted in hypothesis 2, we find
evidence that in analytic tasks, the higher individuals’ EI
competencies the weaker is the effect of their cognitive skills
on performance, or in other words, the less vulnerable is
performance to their levels of cognitive intelligence. In agreement
with Côté and Miners (2006), Agnoli et al. (2012), and Petrides
et al. (2004), we find that those individuals with high EI
competencies but low cognitive abilities, whenever faced with
cognitively challenging tasks, are able to compensate for their
performance by deploying EI competencies. Facing a cognitive
challenge (i.e., when a tasks’ intellectual demands outweigh one’s
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FIGURE 2 | Diagonal figures represent the univariate distribution of each of the variables (densities for continuous variables, bar plots for binary variables). Upper and
lower triangle figures are bivariate distributions of the values. In the case of two continuous variables, instead of a dotplot we have used a bivariate density plot. The
bivariate density plot represents a view from the top, with the lines highlighting areas with increasing density, as in a topographic map. In all cases, colors represent
social (red) and analytic (blue) tasks.
cognitive abilities), can be emotionally taxing. As sentiments
of fear and frustration emerge, they may sabotage one’s focus
and approach motivation. In these situations, having trained
and developed EI competencies, especially those related to self-
awareness and self-management of emotion—such as emotional
self-awareness, emotional self-control, adaptability, achievement
orientation or positive outlook—enables individuals to take
distance from their distressing emotions and re-appraise the
cognitive challenge as an opportunity to learn rather than a
threat, enabling them to keep calm, confident and focused
throughout the task. As such, in analytic tasks, cognitive
intelligence has a weaker impact on performance at higher levels
of EI competencies.
In practice there is, however, a moral downside to a
compensatory (or negative) interaction between EI and g on
performance: it suggests that emotional intelligence is not as
beneficial to those individuals at higher levels of cognitive
intelligence. In fact, there is a widespread shared understanding
that highly intelligent individuals do not really need to learn
emotional intelligence skills, since their cognitive abilities are
high enough to get them all the success they want. Naturally,
this prediction may only make sense in tasks that do not require
collaboration or inter-personal interaction whatsoever.
Conversely, when tasks engage the social cognitive domain
and require social understanding or interpersonal interaction
to be accomplished, high cognitive skills alone may not be
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FIGURE 3 | Coefficient estimates of the direct effects of ESCI, as assessed by professional raters, GMAT and the interaction effect of ESCI*GMAT on individual
performance.
FIGURE 4 | Interaction effect between ESCI and GMAT on the individual performance on social and analytic tasks.
sufficient to succeed. Hypothesis 1 proposes that in social
tasks, cognitive intelligence becomes more consequential to
performance when coupled with stronger rather than weaker
emotional intelligence competencies. i.e., a positive interaction,
wherein EI and g mutually reinforce each other’s contributions to
performance. Although our data did show a positive second order
interaction, by which there was a relatively higher interaction
between EI and g on the performance of social as compared
to analytic courses, this increase was not sufficient to support
hypothesis 1.
We suspect hypothesis 1 found little support in our data
due perhaps to a lack of distinction between social and analytic
tasks across our business school’s MBA courses. Although it is
reasonable to consider that social courses, such as Marketing
or Management, offer humanistic and social related content,
providing greater opportunities for debate, teamwork and, thus,
interpersonal interaction, this may not always be the case in
practice. Teamwork takes time to be fruitful, and often leads to
conflict and wasted time before real collaboration takes place.
Perhaps because our MBA programs are organized into short
trimester courses (rather than semesters), students may choose
to work by themselves rather than lose time trying to figure out
how to deal with cross-cultural teams in such short time period.
Indeed, early on into their MBA program candidates might find
that splitting up teamwork projects into individual components is
more efficient than engaging into actual teamwork, regardless of
course content. Therefore, even if social courses should normally
require more discussion and interaction within teams, the fact
that students forge an individual work system in most courses,
wherein they experience minimal to no personal interaction
among team members, may blur the distinction between social
and analytic tasks.
Limitations
A first limitation in this study concerns the range restriction
in the GMAT, our measure of general cognitive ability. This is
due to an MBA admission criterion that requires candidates to
score above a certain threshold in their GMAT (usually above 600
points). Our attempt to correct for range restriction, by using the
students’ GMAT scores collected from the first time they took the
test, as opposed to the scores with which they were admitted in
the MBA (scores that may have been obtained after attempting
the test several times), was effective insofar as it increased the
variation in GMATs, but was limited to solve the selection bias
within our sample. As such, our ability to make inferences at
lower levels of GMAT was compromised.
Moreover, our performance measures were based on
grades from various MBA courses. Teachers’ assessments of
performance may be biased by the quality of relationships they
establish with students, a phenomenon known as leader-member
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exchange (Graen and Uhl-Bien, 1995), which we were unable to
control for.
Finally, the fact that our data was collected in one specific
school may threaten the external validity of our findings.
Main Contributions and Future Research
To our knowledge, so far only six studies have examined
the interaction between EI and cognitive ability on academic
and job performance; although all have found statistically
significant interactions, some were positive (in job settings)
and others negative (in academic settings; Petrides et al.,
2004; Côté and Miners, 2006; Verbeke et al., 2008; Kidwell
et al., 2011; Agnoli et al., 2012; Fiori, 2015). We join their
shared call for further research that moves beyond incremental
effects and pays attention to the interaction of EI with
interdependent intelligences, such as cognitive ability. This
involves recognizing the false myth in our scholarship by which
EI, or any other construct for that matter, may only be valuable
for research and practice, if it makes an incremental and
independent contribution to performance (Zeidner et al., 2004;
Landy, 2005). Rather, emotional intelligence, as a predictor of
human performance, can be particularly more important and
consequential in multiplicative ways (Murphy, 1996; Hough,
2003). Exploring these interactive paths enables researchers to
discover EI is valuable because it moderates or determines the
extent with which other variables affect performance.
The main contribution this paper offers to future research
lies in the theoretical framework we develop for studying the
interaction of EI and g on performance: the task-dependent
interaction model of EI. By internalizing distinct types of
tasks, social and analytic, within the same sample, this model
provides a potential way to reconcile the divergent findings
among previous interaction studies conducted in organizational
and academic settings. In agreement with Rode et al. (2007),
EI may be significantly more helpful whenever tasks require
a high degree of interpersonal interaction, an observation
that has been thoroughly explored in preliminary research
studying the impact of EI on group processes (Druskat and
Wolff, 2001, 2008; Jordan and Troth, 2004) and the quality of
social interactions (Lopes et al., 2004). Therefore, we encourage
researchers to explore task-dependent models, such as the one
found here, for considering multiplicative effects of EI on human
performance.
However, insofar as academic tasks are modular (i.e., that can
be broken down into smaller and independent tasks), and do not
require students to engage in de facto collaboration, we may be
at odds to observe the catalyzing power (i.e., positive interaction)
of EI competencies on the relationship between cognitive ability
and performance in academic contexts. As such, the replication of
this study in organizations—where a majority of work is done in
teams and require interpersonal interaction (Druskat and Wolff,
2001)—could offer a better chance to gather evidence in support
of hypothesis 1 in our model, wherein emotional intelligence
enhances the effect of intelligence on performance, whenever
social tasks are at stake. Evidence in support of this hypothesis
might provide the much needed incentive for “competent jerks”
(Casciaro and Lobo: 1) to learn EI competencies so as to
effectively collaborate with others.
In addition, our results, together with previous work
(Furnham et al., 2014; Boyatzis et al., 2015), show the importance
of considering 360-degree behavioral assessments of EI. People
at different organizational levels may have unique vantage points
from which to observe distinct facets of behavior, depending
on the specific relationship and rapport they have with the
person being assessed. Therefore, we suggest future research
should benefit from introducing multisource assessments within
different EI measures. Specifically, it would be interesting to
explore the distinctive perspectives across the various sources
within professional but also personal contexts (such as friends,
relatives, partners, etc.), and look into identifying which
particular competencies each rater is best able to observe and
assess.
Finally, we join researchers working on different EI
approaches (e.g., Petrides and Furnham, 2000; Fernández-
Berrocal and Extremera, 2006; Boyatzis et al., 2015) in a shared
call for research that promotes a comprehensive vision of
EI, one that acknowledges the unassailable contribution each
existing measure, be they ability, self-report or behavioral
EI, makes to the advancement of our understanding of what
an emotional intelligent person thinks like, feels like and
acts like.
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